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Introduction 
 
In 2016, Indonesia—the fourth most populous country in the world—received international 
attention for what the Human Rights Watch calls an LGBTQ “Crisis” (2016). Sparked by high 
ranking officials publicly declaring homophobic and transphobic sentiments, a wave of intolerance, 
fear, and hate disseminated throughout the country. Gender and sexual minorities became “fresh 
meat” for political players—government officials, military leaders, religious figures, and other social 
agents competed to take a stand against an “impeding” LGBTQ threat.1 These dialogues catalyzed 
into action as zealous anti-LGBTQ campaigns staked violence and discrimination against gender and 
sexual minorities across Indonesia.  
The “Crisis of 2016” cannot be understood as a resentful reaction to a movement 
ostentatiously claiming space. Homophobia and transphobia have long been slowly encroaching on 
the larger hetero- and cisnormative society, especially through private and localized manners 
(Boellstorff, 2004). Dwelling in this environment, the “threatening” LGBTQ movement has 
struggled to gain basic groundings, and thus hardly qualifies as a challenger to state power in its 
societal influence. 2016, then, may be understood as a political gambit to strategically frame a 
vulnerable, and thus, marketable, minority rights movement. In this political ploy to name the 
LGBTQ community as enemy, how has the movement changed or moved as a result?  
To explore the relationship between political homophobia and transphobia and the LGBTQ 
movement, I pursued a one-month-long field study, conducting interviews with LGBTQ leaders in 
the city of Yogyakarta, on the island of Java, Indonesia. From these interviews, it seems as though 
2016 presented challenges for individual activists, increasingly divided the LGBTQ community, but 
 
1 A participant described the use of the LGBTQ community in Indonesian political games, as the making of a 
collective “fresh meat.” 
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brought the movement closer to other social justice movements. In this report, I present these 
findings from this very limited and exploratory study, in hopes of providing an introductory 
understanding of the effects of state-initiated LGBTQ intolerance. In the future, I hope further 
studies are done to better know the nuanced effects of the “Crisis of 2016.”  
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Methodology 
 
 To understand how politically motivated homophobia and transphobia have affected 
LGBTQ activism in Indonesia, I conducted a field study in Yogyakarta—also known as Jogja, Java, 
Indonesia. Due to time and resource constraints, I narrowed my scope to the LGBTQ movement in 
Jogja; however, this should not be interpreted as a representative or even an introductory 
understanding of the larger movement in Indonesia. It is merely an attempt to begin to understand 
how the anti-LGBTQ sentiment in the national context, localized throughout parts of Indonesia, 
was internalized in the city of Yogyakarta. 
To do this, I sought to speak to “leaders” or more visible “activists” of the city’s LGBTQ 
movement. Wanting to respect and preserve the sanctity of community and trust within these 
LGBTQ-interest groups, I reached out to formal organizations, asking for help finding participants. 
I knew that by seeking out formally organized groups, I may be biasing against informal forms of 
activism; however, I recognized that these groups would require more personal and direct contact. 
Given the sensitive nature of this topic, I chose against engaging in any contact without a trusted 
third-party buffer to respect all potential participants’ feelings of personal safety. Of the five formal 
LGBTQ-interest organizations that I reached out to, four of them responded; however, these are 
but a few of the many existing in Yogyakarta. Four out of the five responded with a desire to meet, 
some requesting an initial contact session for matters relating to security and study ethics. After 
these initial meetings, I was given contact information for potential participants. 
Participants were given an option to either choose to interview in Bahasa Indonesia or 
English, and for those who chose English, I re-emphasized their ability to speak Bahasa Indonesia as 
freely as they pleased. For interviews where I preemptively knew that I would require translation 
assistance, I asked a student from one of the local universities to join, but only after asking the 
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participants themselves if this was permissible. A few participants, at the end of our conversation, 
suggested other participants—reflective of a snowball method of data collection. Through this, I was 
able to speak to “leaders” of more informal forms of advocacy as well. Throughout the course of 
three weeks, I conducted a total of nine interviews each lasting on average between one to two 
hours. The findings from this study are presented in this report. 
My participant selection process, in addition to the relatively small number of participants 
may present several biases, and thus the findings of this study should not be generalized, or even 
taken to be reflective of the larger LGBTQ movement in Yogyakarta. There are many LGBTQ-
interest organizations in Jogja, both formal and informal, whose voices are not represented in this 
study. In addition, of those groups that were interviewed, I was only able to speak to one or two 
individuals from each, and thus, those voices may not fully represent the opinions or thoughts of the 
other members within that organization. In addition, so as not to impose my definition of “leader” 
on the groups themselves, there was no set qualification for what this identity entailed. Thus, there 
may be variation between the groups and organizations as to who was asked to participate. There are 
numerous other biases that have affected the findings of this report that must be taken seriously, so 
as not to overgeneralize the opinions and thoughts of the interviewed individuals to the population 
at large. Further study and research should be conducted to voice these underrepresented 
perspectives.   
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Terminology 
 
 In Indonesia, the term used to describe the movement for diversity in gender and sexual 
identity, orientation, and expression seems to vary. During my study, some participants used the 
term ‘LGBT,’ while others used ‘LGBTQ’ or ‘LGBTIQ,’ or used all of them interchangeably. The 
most commonly used expression was ‘LGBT’; however, because there were participants who 
believed they fit outside the frameworks of ‘LGBT’, but yet saw themselves as a part of the 
movement, I include the Q, queer or questioning, in my study. The Q, although it has been used 
derogatorily against sexual minorities in the past, has also had a history of inclusion. It leaves space 
for all non-heterosexual or non-cisgender sexual and gender minorities, without classifying oneself 
into a category. And because I spoke to individuals who did not categorize their sexual or gender 
identity, and also those who explicitly identified as queer, I believe there is value to including the Q 
in my term for the movement at large.  
In doing this, I hope that I am not excluding those identifying as intersex, asexual, pansexual, 
etc., as they are all individually deserving of attention. But rather, as someone who self-identifies as 
queer and also a queer activist, hope that it is a push towards a larger understanding of gender and 
sexuality as non-binary and non-categorical.  
In addition, when I say ‘LGBTQ’ in this paper, as a term used to describe sexual and gender 
minorities, I am including waria in my considerations. Waria, a local term loosely translated to 
transwoman, however, is and can be, although not necessarily, removed from the actual “LGBTQ” 
movement in Yogyakarta. That is, “LGBTQ” understood as an activist movement in Yogyakarta, is 
different from the term ‘LGBTQ’ used to describe the larger community of all sexual and gender 
minorities, which also includes waria. In doing this, I apologize for any confusion or any unintended 
association of waria to the “LGBTQ” movement. Without doing this, I fear that I will exclude waria 
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entirely from consideration as part of the gender and sexual minority experience, which, as discussed 
later, is not the case. 
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A Need to Evaluate Political Homophobia and Transphobia 
 
 In academia, the ideas of “homophobia” and ‘transphobia” have largely been separated and 
removed from evaluations of state politics. This, as Bosia and Weiss (2013) among others have 
argued, contributes to a continued devaluing of sexuality politics in considerations of “authentic” 
politics. It permits a pattern of state-sponsored homophobia—and transphobia, although Bosia and 
Weiss do not make this distinction—to go unnoticed. The tactical creation of the categorical 
“other”—the threat of the LGBTQ liberation—is a political ploy that pivots state or individual 
actors’ benefits against the rights of gender and sexual minorities (Boellstorff, 2004). In its rhetoric, 
it frames the LGBTQ movement as an enemy of the state, and the nation’s culture and moral 
values—a “national threat” juxtaposed with a sense of urgency (McKay & Angotti, 2016). This 
encroaching “danger,” Bosnia and Weiss have found, does not coincide with progress or provoking 
action by the local LGBTQ movement, rights event or action, often in the presence of weak or non-
existent activism (2013, p. 13). Whatever activism exists, it harms or paralyzes, for the advantage of 
state actors and the elite ruling class (Bosnia & Weiss, 2013, p. 15).  
Although it may be unfair to call the events of 2016 political homophobia or transphobia, 
because the political motivations and or beneficiaries are unknown, we can at least look at how it 
was instigated, disseminated and affected sexual and gender minorities. Because, regardless of 
motivation, the effect is nonetheless real, and should be considered seriously.  
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The “Crisis” of 2016 
 
 In the past few years, Indonesia has seen an increase in homophobia and transphobia, some 
calling it “The Crisis of 2016” and an “Anti-LGBT Moral Panic” (Davies, 2016; Human Rights 
Watch, 2016). It’s believed to have started in January of 2016, when Muhammad Nasir, Indonesia’s 
Minister of Research, Technology, and Higher Education stated that LGBT groups should be barred 
from university campuses, arguing that universities have an obligation to uphold moral values 
(Zuhdiar, 2016). He added that the country’s universities should withdraw support from campus 
organizations promoting LGBT activities (Zuhdiar, 2016).2 In a response to public dissent, Nasir 
softened his earlier statements via Twitter, stating that it is not “LGBTs,” but the activity of 
“showing romance, kissing and malcing love [in public]” that he finds problematic; however, the 
anti-LGBTQ effect of his earlier statement had already begun (Fauzi, 2016).3 Following Nasir’s 
statements, prominent public officials, along with other social actors joined in to express their own 
homophobic sentiments, including:  
 February 12, 2016: Yuddy Chrisnandi, Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform Minister 
stated that homosexuality within civil servants is unacceptable, adding that while the practice of 
polygamy is still normal, LGBT is not (Human Rights Watch, 2016). 
 February 16, 2016: Khofifa Indar Parawansa, Minister of Social Affairs, stated that on a 
recent trip to Lombok, she found that LGBT groups targeted young boys with gifts and lipsticks, 
converting them “in a very short time” (Human Rights Watch, 2016). 
 
2 Zuhdiar of Antara News reports Nasir’s original statement: “Masa kampus untuk itu? Ada standar nilai dan 
standar susila yang harus dijaga. Kampus adalah penjaga moral… Kelompok LGBT tidak boleh dibiarkan 
berkembang dan diberi ruang segala aktivitasnya. Apalagi, komunitas LGBT disinyalir masuk ke kampus dengan 
kelompok kajian atau diskusi ilmiah.”   
3 Gilang Fauzi of CNN Indonesia reports Nasir’s tweet January 25, 2016: "Larangan saya terhadap LGBT masuk 
kampus apabila mereka melakukan tindakan yang kurang terpuji seperti bercinta atau pamer kemesraan di kampus.” 
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February 20, 2016: Indonesia’s Defense Minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu stated that the LGBT 
movement is a proxy war used to subtly used to threaten state power, likening the community’s 
demands to a weapon more dangerous than a nuclear bomb (Tempo.co, 2016).  
February 27, 2016: The Secretary General of the Hanura Party, Berliana Kartakusumah, 
encouraged banning LGBT individuals, like the nation banned communism and drug trafficking 
(Davies, 2016). 
March 7, 2016: Mahfudz Siddiq, a member of the House of Representatives stated that 
“LGBT issues can damage national security, identity, culture, and the faith of Indonesians” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2016). 
These are just a few of the examples of the homophobic and transphobic discourses that 
were used in 2016 by state actors. The charged words incited consequences—violent attacks and 
expressed widespread intolerance of the LGBTQ community across the nation.   
 
A Look at Yogyakarta  
 
To give one example of how a wave of homophobia showed itself, I looked closely at one 
city—Yogyakarta. It’s important to remember, however, that the anti-LGBTQ movement varied 
greatly by region, and Yogyakarta, and more specifically the city of Yogyakarta, is only a small part 
of a much larger nation. There are especially differences between urban and rural areas. Even within 
Yogyakarta, there are variations between the activists’ understandings of 2016. From those with 
whom I spoke to, there appears to be three larger incidents that defined the “LGBTQ crisis,” 
although not all participants recognized all three: 
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In February, 2016: Pondok Pesantren Waria Al-Fatah, believed to be the only Islamic boarding 
school for transwomen, was confronted by an Islamic fundamentalist group, FUI (Forum Umat 
Islam), known as Islamic Community Forum. FUI strategically spread transphobia to the school’s 
previously accepting and welcoming neighbors. They, together with members of FUI demanded that 
Pondok Pesantran be shut down. Members of the pesantren went to the police to seek assistance and 
protection. While the police provided physical protection and security of the building’s quarters, they 
did not investigate the perpetrators—FUI. Seeking to report this police misconduct, members of the 
pesantren demanded a copy of the official file, in order to file a claim with higher authorities. The 
police refused to provide a copy of this report (Participant A, Participant B, Participant D, 
Participant E, Participant H).  
On February 23, 2016, there was a conflict between the Democratic Solidarity Movement 
and an anti-LGBT protest, both of whom had planned a march on the same date and time in 
Yogyakarta. The Democratic Solidarity Movement, representing a multitude of issues and interests 
including LGBTQ voices, was attacked by the anti-LGBTQ marchers with violence. A fight initiated 
between members in the two groups. Then, on April 2, 2016 Lady Fast, a women’s art and film 
exhibition was shut down by the police, FUI, and FJI (Front Jihad Islam), Front of Jihadist Islam. 
Participants said that homophobic rhetoric was used during the pursuit, “accusing” some of them of 
“lesbianism” (Participant A, Participant B, Participant D, Participant E, Participant G).  
In addition to more public forms of physical confrontation and violence, individualized hate 
crime and less direct, but nonetheless traumatic, hate speech increased. Throughout the city of 
Yogyakarta, posters, banners, and signs with anti-LGBTQ hate speech expressing intolerance, 
denouncing human rights, calling it a mental illness demanding conversion therapy were displayed. 
Some restaurants posted signs reading, “LGBT Dilarang Masuk”—LGBT are not allowed to enter 
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(Figure 1). This rhetoric trickled into residential spaces as well. Rumah Kos, small dormitory-styled 
living spaces, updated their house rules to say drugs, alcohol, and LGBT are not allowed (Figure 2). 
Although prior to 2016, visibly identifiable members of the LGBTQ community faced 
discrimination in housing, in 2016, landlords made conscious efforts to expel waria from their 
quarters. Several of my participants stated that the rise in hate speech was an indicator of the 
“crisis.” Prior to 2016, they said that while in media, or in other spaces, they experienced anti-LGBT 
rhetoric, they rarely saw banners or posters deliberately targeting the community. Then, in 2016, 
both public and private spaces became avenues for spreading homophobia and transphobia 
(Participant A, Participant B, Participant C, Participant G, Participant H).  
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo Credits: Anonymous 
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Figure 2 
 
Participants described the danger of being identified as pro-LGBTQ on the streets, whether 
by a visible identity or by wearing pro-movement gear on the streets. Waria, whose identity as a 
member of the LGBTQ community is more readily identifiable, were randomly attacked by 
strangers on the street—using both verbal or physical assault, throwing cans of water, etc. One 
participant recalled a friend who was confronted by FUI for having a “Stop Bullying” pin, with a 
rainbow background on their backpack (Participant A, Participant B, Participant C, Participant D, 
Participant G, Participant H).  
In addition, there were targeted attacks on LGBTQ activists and allies. One activist 
described how a fundamentalist took a picture of their motorbike tag, saying it will be posted, 
threatening to “be careful.” One member of an LGBTQ-interest organization shared how in 2016 
their office was actively sought out for, with hate speech graffitied on the organization’s signs across 
the street. Luckily, when the fundamentalist group came searching, everyone had already left, so 
there was no physical altercation. Nonetheless, the organization relocated anyways for fear of attack. 
Even allies, in supporting their LGBTQ counterparts, were accused of either being “gay” or 
“lesbian” or attacked for expressing their solidarity.   
These effects are understood differently by members of Jogja’s LGBTQ community, and 
seem to vary by age, sexual and gender identity, engagement with activism, etc., and thus, should not 
Photo Credits: Anonymous 
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be understood in any way as a comprehensive explanation of all experiences. This is especially true 
given the many unrepresented voices in my study. However, from this, we can at least begin to 
understand the atmosphere of homophobia and transphobia in Yogyakarta in 2016.  
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What’s in a ‘Crisis’? 
A Pattern of Sustained Homophobia 
 
In evaluating the rise of hostility against the LGBTQ community, we should be careful not 
to imply a duality—that is, a homophobic “crisis” in 2016 does not mean LGBTQ oppression and 
marginalization did not exist prior. To do this, would be to ignore the long history of oppression, 
discrimination and violence endured by the community well before 2016. Participants stressed this 
underrepresented truth—heteronormativity, cisnormativity, homophobia and transphobia 
manifested in discrimination, hate, and oppression existed well before the claimed “crisis.” In fact, 
some participants even expressed resentment or confusion on the concentrated attention to 2016—
to create the illusion that LGBTQ life is somehow now under attack, is inherently political, as the 
community has long felt unaccepted and oppressed. Throughout the country, the LGBTQ identity 
was shaped as an enemy to the people, to morality, and to national security. It was a framed as a 
Western agenda, particularly by the United States to start a ‘proxy war’ in the country.  
This sentiment mimics Tom Boellstorff’s analysis of Indonesia’s attitude towards LGBT in 
2004: a heteronormative society with pockets of progressing homophobia. His study—of which 
contains an important distinction between an atmosphere of pro-heterosexual relationships, usually 
as a result of normalization, and that of intentional hate and intolerance against homosexual ones—
shows how oppression and a systematic silencing of sexual minorities may exist, even without an 
active homophobic voice before 2016 (Boellstorff, 2004). Boellstorff does not speak on the status of 
cisnormativity versus transphobia within the archipelago; however, in this absence, we should not 
assume that transphobia mirrors nor progresses with homophobia. Several participants noted 
society’s perception of and experiences within the transgender community as distinct from that of 
their lesbian and gay counterparts, of which is explained in greater detail in sections to follow. 
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Nonetheless, whether Indonesia is either heteronormative or cisnormative, both, or progressing 
towards each’s respective counterparts—the community has been silenced to tread carefully as 
outsiders of society’s accepted norms. As a result, they might have had lower visibility; however, this 
should hardly be accepted as tolerance, nor give an allusion of a thriving community. 2016 should be 
understood as tactically raising visibility of anti-LGBTQ, when the LGBTQ movement has yet to 
claim the same space.  
 
More than Religion 
 
In evaluating political homophobia and transphobia in Indonesia, we should avoid faulting 
the increasing homophobia and transphobia to the Islamic faith. A few of the news reports in 
English on the “Crisis of 2016,” directly or indirectly relate Islam to the creation of anti-LGBTQ 
intolerance. They note the country’s increasing religiosity and the large Muslim population as a 
descriptive setting; however, in the Western gaze, this is interpreted with a guiding assumption—No 
surprise, of course homophobic and transphobic attacks occur in Muslim-dominant countries. These hidden 
Islamophobic assumptions are precisely the reason why homophobia and transphobia need to be 
considered in a political context (let’s also not forget Christianity’s history of intolerance as well). 
While it is true that some of the violent attacks against the LGBTQ community were by Islamic 
fundamentalist groups, it’s insufficient to say that the widespread intolerance of 2016 is a product of 
the Islamic faith. As Boellstorff explains, homophobia used as a political strategy is different from 
societal homophobia, as political homophobia involves a tactical creation and incitement of 
intolerance (2004). To evaluate or assume that the “Crisis of 2016” was a result of Indonesia’s 
dominant religion—Islam—is erroneous, as it devalues the role of political agents and a strategic 
exploitation of a minority identity for selfish gain. Thus, in this study I focus on the role of political 
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homophobia, even though I recognize religion may also play a role in the creation of societal 
homophobia. 
 
 
A State of Identity-Targeting Political Turbulence 
 
The LGBTQ community was not the only group under siege in 2016—in fact, the year was a 
year of turbulence for minority groups across the country. This includes the Papuan community, 
communists—and in its pursuit—socialists, religious minorities, and the Chinese and Chinese 
Indonesian community. The 2016 can be understood as a year of instability for many of these 
minority groups. The increase in oppression against other minority groups show the political nature 
of 2016—almost like chaos by design. Although many of these groups faced increased hostility, the 
most well identified and publicized is the LGBTQ crisis. This can be understood strategically as 
well—one unified “other” is stronger than many divided efforts.  
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Effects on the LGBTQ Movement 
 
These openly homophobic sentiments found itself in violence, hate crimes, discrimination 
and oppression against the LGBTQ community throughout the country. In Yogyakarta, through my 
limited, exploratory study, I began to understand the ways in which the dissemination of 
homophobia affected the LGBTQ movement and activism in 2016. I would, however, like to re-
emphasize the diversity of LGBTQ-interest groups and organizations, whose voices are excluded 
from this study. I only spoke to a small portion of the many formal and informal groups due to time 
and resource constraints. Thus, we should approach the findings mindful of potential bias against an 
unrepresented voice. Of those with whom I spoke to, there seems to be a few ways in which we can 
understand how activism was affected in 2016: 
 
 
Hindrances to Individual Participation 
 
 Individuals were discouraged from joining or staying in LGBTQ-interest groups. As 
mentioned earlier, LGBTQ individuals, activists, allies were targeted, causing fear of being affiliated 
with the movement. It seems like the fear revolved around concerns for physical security, as well as 
a fear of ostracization, or a future damnation—a worry that somehow one will be publicly outed, 
and for the rest of their life be discoverable as LGBTQ. 
 
Effects on Activists’ Mental Health 
 
 As a result of the “panic,” activists faced mental health issues. One participant described the 
year as “psychological terror,” saying: “[The nation] somehow panicking making us panic, even for 
the LGBT who is not part of the movement” (Participant H). The persisting homophobia and 
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transphobia created a psychologically taxing atmosphere for members, and especially for active 
leaders within the movement. One activist described how in 2016, they often had trouble sleeping at 
night. In continuing support for the LGBTQ community, they witnessed a lot of the hateful and 
violent attacks, causing them and the other activists, to be “sick” the following year—as one 
participant describes—i.e. overly exhausted. Some sought asylum outside of the country, while 
others withdrew from movement efforts for mental health purposes as a result. Organizations, 
already burdened by member-inactivity, external threat, and decreasing voice, were further 
weakened:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
[Our organization] before depend on the activist. One or two activists. So, when one or two 
activist have problem, like psychological problem, because of the crackdown—I mean [our 
organization] collapsed slowly. Losing the members. The program is not really work properly 
(Participant B). 
 Activists generally seem to be understanding towards peers seeking mental health services 
and asylum, even if it means leaving the movement at critical times. Others seem to disagree, 
criticizing these leaders who leave the movement as benefactors of elite activism. One participant 
stated that the ideas of “well-being” and “mental health” were newly introduced in 2016 to activist 
discourses in Indonesia, saying 2016 was the first year it was brought up. Those leaving, some 
participants stated, are capitalizing on their financial and opportunity privilege to find peace while 
the larger group suffers. In addition, participants expressed concern for using mental health as 
justification to leave—although they recognize the legitimate claim in it—as an excuse that further 
displays elitism within the movement. Their argument: many activists suffered from mental health 
issues during 2016, but were not aware of the actual term. To take awareness of “wellness” and exit 
the movement, leaves the difficult tasks to activists who are financially less privileged.  
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Elevated Family Pressures 
 
Activists, even those internally strongly devoted to the movement, faced challenges from 
family. Family members in the past, it seems, generally did not support LGBTQ activism, but 
passively accepted it. 2016, however, raised the visibility of the concept of ‘LGBT’ and                                                                                     
of LGBTQ activism throughout the nation. Thus, family members became familiar with the 
negative stereotypes associated with sexual minorities, and suddenly began using the rhetoric 
disseminated from the outside homophobia and transphobia:  
  You know, you make a big scene by keep on, defending the, fighting for the gays. What are 
you going to be? You are going to be sent to hell. Everyday you made a sinful act.” Before 
[2016] they never talk to me about that, but after they do (Participant H). 
Coming from a family member, the shift between passive acceptance to suddenly charging sin and 
damnation can be alarming at best, and incredibly painful and disheartening. The crisis from the  
outside had somehow infiltrated their private sphere, one where they could previously determine when  
and how LGBTQ issues were discussed. 
 The dissemination of homophobia and transphobia into private-life seemed to especially 
affect younger activists. For some, it changed family members’ perception of what it means to be 
LGBTQ, while for others it created a new fear for a child engaged with LGBTQ activism. One  
participant spoke on their parents’ overall loving support for their sexual identity, but disapproval of 
working in activism and advocacy: 
 “Why are you working in that sensitive issue. You shouldn’t working in that kind of... that is 
too sensitive, you shouldn’t working in that kind of issue (Participant C).” 
The members who disengaged from activism at the request of family members stated that they were 
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just thankful to have parents who accept their sexual identity. They recognize the difficulty in having 
an LGBTQ child, let alone accepting that child.  Thus, participants emphasized how they respectfully 
listen to the requests by accepting family members, even if it means leaving the movement.  
 This seemed to particularly affect young members of the LGBTQ community, which may be 
due to the importance of elder respect in Javanese and Indonesian culture.  
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Dividing the Community  
 
Separation by Political Identity 
  
Prior to 2016, LGBTQ-interest organizations were facing increasingly worsening division by 
political identity.  The separation of formal and informal groups by identity interests seems to 
coincide with Ridwan and Wu’s analysis of LGBTQ activism in Indonesia; however, in Yogyakarta, 
there seem to be further divisions. Ridwan and Wu identified three common types of LGBT groups: 
trans group, groups for gay men and MSM—men who have sex with other men—who put a focus 
on HIV and AIDs education and prevention, and those for lesbian and bisexual women, who focus 
on violence against women (2018). It seems like these separations are largely true, although, in 
Yogyakarta, I was unable to find any services specifically for lesbian and bisexual interests. In 
addition, the transgender community is further divided in Yogyakarta—services for transwomen and 
transmen are separate. And, as mentioned earlier, services for waria, in the sense of the local term, 
seems to be separated from efforts for ‘transwoman’ as a part of the Western ‘LGBT’ term.  
 These separations existed prior to 2016, and in fact, according to some of my participants 
they have been progressively getting worse since the end of Suharto’s regime. After 2016, however, 
there seems to have been some more separation, or at least a furthering of already existing 
separations. This might have been due to the overall panic and negative stigma around the term 
‘LGBT’ that pushed organizations and groups to disassociate. For example, some of my participants 
described that some HIV/AIDs-interest groups made efforts to dissociate with the LGBTQ 
movement. These effects were especially exacerbated by funding sources, which especially into later 
2016 and 2017, were explicitly against any LGBTQ related programming. One of the participants 
described being rejected from an HIV/AIDs clinic, after responding to a required question on the 
pre-service questionnaire, “Are you LGBT?” A criticism, however, is that these organizations, even 
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prior to 2016, were specifically only catered to the gay population, largely leaving the trans, lesbian, 
and bisexual communities excluded from care. Therefore, it’s possible the only significant effect on 
HIV/AIDs-prevention organizations in 2016 was a move away from supporting gay men and MSM 
in Yogyakarta. 
 Waria-interest efforts were also further detached from LGBTQ ones. As described earlier, 
waria face a lot of difficulty with harassment on the streets, discrimination in housing, work, school 
and other public spaces, and difficulties obtaining an ID card for health services. These hindrances 
among others it seems, made it necessary for waria-based organizations to build a separate identity in 
the 2000s. There does also seem to be a wider acceptance, or at least an understanding of the idea of 
waria. One waria-interest organization described being supported by Indonesia’s largest Muslim 
organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), although the same group openly detested LGBT in 2016. The 
participant stated: 
… [NU] support transwomen, yea. But not support LGBT. You must separate this thing: 
They support transwomen, but they not support LGBT (Participant).4  
According to them, Nahdlatul Ulama actually increased backing for waria that year. It is unclear 
what NU’s exact motivations to support the organization was, but it may be understood in a few 
ways that further explains what precisely it is about ‘LGBT’ that is politically profitable.  
They said that Islam is accept transwoman who is transwoman from the childhood. He’s 
already being transwoman, so they accept that. All of who start from Islamic school 
boarding, and is transwoman (Participant).5  
 
4 I purposefully refrain from identifying this participant in this context.  
5 I purposefully refrain from identifying this participant in this context. 
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A woman, who knows she is a transwoman from a young age, especially if she has grown up in the 
context of an Islamic boarding school, is acceptable. When the participant was describing this 
thought, it was unclear if it was the idea of a heterosexual transwoman, homosexual transwoman, or 
a heterosexual cross-dressing man, but when we continued speaking, it seemed to be precisely this 
that made waria more acceptable—an identity not intrinsically tied to one’s sexual desires or 
inclinations. This somehow legitimizes this identity, further incentivizing waria-interest groups to 
separate from the larger LGBT movement.  
 
 
Against the “LGBTQ Activist” 
 
 There also appears to be stigma or sense of separation within the LGBTQ movement 
against individuals considered “activists.” Many individuals, especially those unaffiliated with official 
organizations were quick to say that they are not activists: 
I also cannot say that I am an activist…So I’m not the one who jump into the streets 
marching and do that kind of stuff, but I’m working, I’m working under the table, behind 
the table, working with issue in the empowerment (Participant C).  
This idea of an “activist” seems to describe an individual who is loud, protesting in the streets, and 
relentlessly advocating for LGBTQ rights regardless of situational conditions. 
You know I say that I’m loud, but only in my circle. But some of [the activists] are like really 
loud, and they didn’t take any consideration into their environment. But that could be like 
dangerous for me. I mean if you just like really loud to everyone and didn’t consider 
environment and the people that you are telling that you are gay, it could be dangerous, I 
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think. Like how like it can make like those people feel dangerous, so they can just do 
something bad.  
It’s not just me—my identity, but the whole people in the community. You know there’s this 
one person who is really loud, “Okay, I’m a lesbian. Blah blah blah.” And it’s to literally 
everyone around her, even though she knows that some people could feeling like triggered 
by that. And I don’t want to like trigger anyone. Because it could be danger for people in 
community, not only me, but literally everyone in LGBT community in Indonesia 
(Participant F). 
Thus, there seems to be resentment against these “loud” activists, because they taint the image of 
the LGBTQ movement as radical, bringing this hate and backlash against the community, even 
sometimes inciting violence.  
Since it’s already been culture how people are proud to be straight, or how... the 
homophobia, the bigotry is already being part of the culture. That’s why we need to make a 
softer approach. If we want to empower them. Especially like that, elections, the issue of 
elections. Uh... lately the LGBT being part of political war. Political weapon... uh, so it’s 
pretty important for us to take the right step (Participant C). 
As one participant describes, there are two kinds of LGBTQ individuals, although I think from 
these further nuanced examples, there may be three. 
  You can say that there is […] two kind of LGBT around me. The first is those who are 
LGBT and proud, and want to offer support activism and are declare, declare about them 
self in the righteous way, like putting the rainbow flag on the Instagram, and those things. 
And the second one is those who... they are gay, they are lesbians, but they are more chill. 
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And “okay, I support our group, my group, but I cannot expose it to my social life” 
(Participant C).  
Here the separation is a binary between an openly out activist and a quiet individual who is not out 
to anyone. But in speaking with the participants explicitly identifying as “non-activist,” there seems 
to be at least another potential classification: those advocating for LGBTQ-interests in less public 
spaces, where their identity is more controlled, providing support and community for others. What’s 
interesting here, is that it seems that some of the homophobic and transphobic rhetoric from the 
“crisis” outside has transcended within the movement itself. There seems to be a blaming of the 
more outspoken “activists” for confirming or provoking negative backlash or even violence.  
In this division between activist and non-activist, there is also a separation between “loud” 
LGBTQ versus “softer” LGBTQ. “Loud” activism seems to be equated to working to promote 
LGBTQ-interests beyond fundamental rights, while a “softer” approach aims to advocate for basic 
rights for the community: 
What I did is pretty soft approach to LGBT issue, by showing the side of human rights. 
That’s the most acceptable side if you want to empower LGBT in Indonesia. By saying that, 
“Well, at least they are human. They should have the basic rights to the human things,” but 
if you coming, if you want to take into like, “Oh LGBT should have rights to express 
themselves. Rights to marry.” People are going to be screaming out. […] I mean like […] 
how actually people get killed just because they are LGBT. […]The main argument that I tell 
to people is, “You cannot, you can say that you are not accepting them, but at least you 
respecting them as human being.”  (Participant C).  
The “loud” activism, associated with the idea “activist” goes too far, because it advocates for 
things like marriage equality, which causes zealous homophobia in the cultural context. “Softer” 
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approaches focus on the human rights of LGBTQ individuals, asking for basic services such as 
health care—a problem members of the transgender community face without sufficient state-
provided identification—arguing, “Aren’t all humans entitled to these rights?” What’s interesting is 
that even the participants who others may consider “loud activists” mentioned a rights-based 
platform.  
Of course, on a national scale there may be visible, “loud” activists, who engage in more 
“radical” forms of activism, and negatively change the face of LGBTQ activism. From the 
participants I spoke to in Yogyakarta, however, there seems to be a unanimous understanding of 
what activism should and can do within the surrounding cultural frame—fundamental rights and 
safety for LGBTQ. This separation then, may be understood as a product of political homophobia 
and transphobia within the movement itself: a resentment and dissociation with the “activists” 
worsening the zealous intolerance for all LGBTQ.  
 
 
Loss of Member to Member Support 
 
 Organizations and groups reported limiting or closing-down activities as a result of the 
events of 2016. As mentioned earlier, some organizations were stopped or hindered by fear of or 
direct confrontations with anti-LGBTQ vigilantes. Those who closed expressed concern for the 
safety, reputation and welfare of their organization. The fear of contributing to the negative 
stereotype associated with the LGBTQ community seems to be a concern. 
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If we, we activity secretly, this is look like we are doing something bad, something false. We 
believe we are doing everything is the good, and the good thing. So be brave in that activity, 
because we are, we believe this is uh something good (Participant A).  
Especially in visible moments such as these, when they are directly attacked by hate and violence, 
they seem to value acting calmly, to carefully tread a line so as to not contribute to the problem. This 
includes closing down services for months. Although these activists may have received support 
through other means, the larger organization was absent as a result of the political homophobia and 
transphobia of 2016.  
Some organizations described “filtering” their members. They feared that somehow their 
location would be revealed again, or that the personal identity of the members could be 
compromised. Thus, in order to protect the future of their organization, they had to reevaluate their 
members and limit services to those that they trusted. This of course limits access of services for 
members of the LGBTQ community; however, there is the larger concern for their own safety.  
It also seems as though groups, especially on college campuses were affected. In the 
University of Indonesia in Jakarta, a support group, known as SGRC (Support Group and Resource 
Center on Sexuality Studies) was attacked and shut down. The center offered counseling for its 
university students via a hotline; however, when pamphlets offering the service were distributed, 
they were faced with heated resentment. Intolerant anti-LGBT groups attacked SGRC, and public 
officials offered no support to protect the students (Participant D, Participant E).  
From this, it seems as though formal methods of support for the LGBTQ community were 
limited. Visible organizations and support networks were hindered by non-state actors, whose 
actions were maintained through legal avenues and state power. The organizations, facing injustice, 
were forced to be complicit, in recognition of the effects of their actions on the larger LGBTQ 
community, and for the future survival of the organization. Of course, we can hardly say these were 
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deliberate choices—they were made in times where security and safety were threatened. It’s 
important then to see how access to members of the LGBTQ community were affected. If, as we 
saw earlier, individuals were personally affected in 2016, decreasing formal support may further 
silence activism. 
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Changing the Movement 
 
 Challenged and oppressed by state and non-state actors, the LGBTQ movement persisted in 
the hands of devoted activists. As methods of activism became increasingly unfeasible, the 
movement explored new avenues for advocacy and LGBTQ support. 
 
Strengthening Solidarity 
 As a result of some of the events in 2016, it seems as though the larger LGBTQ movement 
began sharing more solidarity with other minority groups. Although, as discussed previously in this 
essay, the LGBTQ movement itself began to separate by political ideology, the collective support for 
‘LGBT’ strengthened. This may have come as a result of increased oppression and attacks on several 
groups in Yogyakarta, demanding a collective and unified voice. On February 23, 2016, the 
Democratic Solidarity Movement planned a march on the same day as an anti-LGBTQ protest. The 
demonstrations were planned for the same day, at the same time, just in different parts of the city. 
The Democratic Solidarity Movement’s march was subsequently attacked by anti-LGBTQ 
protestors. Even though they were not marching only for LGBTQ-interests, but rather for all 
oppressed voices fighting for democracy, this event showed them putting LGBTQ-rights on a much 
higher pedestal—this issue is sufficient enough to rally on a day specifically concerning LGBTQ 
rights.  
 Democracy is threatened because of the situation. So we fight for LGBT, we fight for it. If 
anyone created that demonstration as LGBT demonstration, it’s not true. I’m the 
coordinator of the demonstration, and I can say that it’s not LGBT demonstration. It’s uh 
pro-democracy group that fight for demonstration group that hate LGBT, you know? […] 
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But that’s the first time that every movement joined together and try to put aside their group 
interest and fight for democracy (Participant B). 
Thus, it can be understood as a development of solidarity: both to the pro-democracy  
movement to the LGBTQ-interest, and that of the LGBTQ struggle to the larger effort of  
democracy.  As stated earlier, this effort is not representative of the LGBTQ group at large, as there  
are many divisions within it. Some of these groups and independent individuals have expressed  
disagreement and resentment towards efforts such as these. 
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Conclusion 
 In 2016 the LGBTQ community of Yogyakarta became “fresh meat” for political game. 
Framing sexual and gender minorities as a threat requiring immediate retaliation, the movement, 
already facing challenges in an increasingly homophobic and transphobic society, was brought under 
siege. In efforts to better know the effects of state-issued intolerance, this study looked closer at 
LGBTQ activists and leaders in the city of Yogyakarta. From these interviews, I began to 
understand activism as a result of 2016 in these ways:  
 Individual activists were challenged and deterred from further participation in the LGBTQ 
movement. Seen as sinners, activists feared for their personal safety. They were attacked by anti-
LGBTQ vigilantes, and this in turn, created a fear for other activists to withdraw participation. In 
addition, activists faced mental health challenges, a result of fighting the growing homophobia and 
transphobia. Some leaders, especially those exposed to multiple traumatic experiences, disaffiliated 
which had repercussions for a movement heavily dependent on its leaders. In addition, activists 
faced increased restrictions or disapproval from family members. The homophobia and transphobia 
from outside began infiltrating their family lives and proceeded to further discourage activism.  
 The LGBTQ movement itself was further divided as a result of 2016. Prior to 2016, there 
were many divisions by political identity—waria, gay men and MSM, transmen, HIV/AIDs, etc. As 
“LGBTQ” became increasingly negatively stigmatized, organizations and activists made conscious 
efforts to dissociate from the larger movement. This seems to be particularly true for the waria 
community and the HIV/AIDs interest groups in Yogyakarta. In addition, there were also divisions 
between the larger movement as well against “loud” activism and activists. As rhetoric from the 
outside concerning the threatening LGBTQ movement disseminated into the movement, members 
sought to remove themselves from this perceived problematic form of activism. In doing so, they 
separate the identity of activist to that of elevating human rights for sexual and gender minorities.  
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 In facing these challenges, the larger LGBTQ movement also seems to have gained solidarity 
with pro-democracy groups, and thus with other minority groups across Yogyakarta. The LGBTQ 
issue was legitimately recognized as needing collective effort. Thus, although the movement faced 
increased difficulties within, especially via fission dictated by political identity, the movement grew 
stronger in support on the outside.  
 In claiming these findings, I would like to re-emphasize the importance of understanding 
2016 and its events in a much broader context of LGBTQ history in Indonesia. Oppression and 
intolerance of gender and sexual minorities have long existed and have been slowly increasing since 
2010. The “Crisis of 2016” should be understood as significant but maybe not quite pivotal in 
obstruction of LGBTQ activism nor experience. This is especially true given the broad range of 
intersectional factors that nuance individual LGBTQ experience in Indonesia. For these reasons and 
others, the LGBTQ community should be further studied as limited studies, such as this, capture 
only a small fraction of a much larger story. This story, carrying grief, sorrow, passion, strength and 
resilience deserves to be authentically viewed and valued. It is a story important not only to queer 
theorists, but to all interested in the construction of oppressive power—that is, political 
homophobia and transphobia as powerful methods of control by state and non-state actors.  
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